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I.  
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Court’s order of May 7, 2009, (the “Order to Redact”), the Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) for Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, a 
corporation sole incorporated as an Alaska religious corporation  (the “Diocese” or the 
“Debtor”), hereby brings this redacted motion for authority: (a) to commence, prosecute and 
settle adversary proceedings under Bankruptcy Code Sections 544, 547, 548, 549 and 550 
(“Avoidance Actions”), (b) to commence, prosecute and settle an adversary proceeding against 
the Holy See and (c) to file a third-party complaint against the Holy See for equitable 
apportionment in the pending state court abuse litigation (the “Motion”). 
The only changes between this redacted Motion and the Motion in its original form are 
as follows:  (1) Exhibit J of the original motion has been eliminated and (2) the references to 
Exhibit J of the original motion and to the testimony of Father Richard Case contained in Exhibit 
J or the original motion have been eliminated.   
Since the first hearing in this case, all of the parties recognized that a fundamental issue is 
what property is included in the estate.  The Diocese disclaims any beneficial interest in the 
millions of dollars worth of real and personal property and liquid investments in favor of its 
parishes and affiliated Catholic entities.  An essential element of the analysis of the Debtor’s 
position is the consideration of the Avoidance Actions.  The Diocese is too intertwined with the 
interests of the parishes and affiliated Catholic entities who will be the defendants to exercise a 
fiduciary duty to creditors in assessing and, if need be, prosecuting that litigation.1  Plainly, the 
                                                 
1 For example, Fr. Robert Fath, parochial vicar of Sacred Heart Cathedral, is one of the two addressees on the letter 
of retention between the Catholic Church Communities of Northern Alaska (“CCCNA”) and counsel.  The CCCNA 
was formed for the purpose of asserting the parishes’ interest in the assets of the estate.  Verified Statement, (Docket 
no. 105).  According to the Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church, parochial vicars are “[C]o-workers with the 
pastor and sharers in his solicitude, they are to offer service in the pastoral ministry by common counsel and effort 
with the pastor and under his authority. “).  http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__P1U.HTM.  Bishop Kettler 
is the pastor of Sacred Heart Cathedral.   
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Debtor is not the “honest broker” to address the property claims and Avoidance Actions.  The 
Committee and not the Debtor, is the only party who can legitimately represent the creditors’ 
interests on this issue.  Therefore, the Committee seeks the right to commence, prosecute and 
settle (subject to Court approval) litigation to enforce all of the estate’s rights under Bankruptcy 
Code §§ 544, 547, 548, 549 and 550.   
Following a status conference in the case, the Court stated that the Committee could 
pursue litigation options after November 14, 2007 if mediation did not resolve the property 
issues.  The mediation was unsuccessful.  On December 5, 2007, the Committee sent the Debtor 
a demand that the Debtor commence certain property litigation against the Diocese-Related 
Entities.  (Exhibit A)  The Debtor rejected that demand.  (Exhibit B)  Following receipt of that 
rejection and upon review of the Sixth Circuit’s November 24, 2008 decision in O’Bryan v. Holy 
See, 2008 WL 4964143 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding Holy See not immune from suit based on 
negligence), the Committee sent the Debtor a demand that it commence litigation against the 
Holy See.  (Exhibit C)  The Debtor has rejected that demand as well.  (Exhibit D)   
The Debtor unreasonably rejected the Committee’s demand to prosecute the Avoidance 
Actions.   
The Committee seeks to commence an action against the Holy See for breach of its duties 
to the Diocese (including the filing of a third-party complaint against the Holy See for equitable 
apportionment under Rule 14(c) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure in the underlying state 
court abuse cases) by commanding that all claims regarding sexual abuse of minors be kept 
secret.  But for this dictate of the Pope, public disclosure, including reporting sexual abuse of 
minors to the police, would have decreased the instances of sexual abuse by the clergy of the 
Diocese of Fairbanks.  Bishop Kettler is appointed as the Bishop of Fairbanks by the Pope and is 
subject to his authority.  Just as the Diocese has not exercised its fiduciary duties as to the 
Diocese-Related Entities, it cannot do so as to the Holy See. 
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II.  
JURISDICTION 
On March 1, 2008, (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor, filed a petition for relief under 
chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code.  The Debtor continues in possession of its assets 
pursuant to Sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The Court has jurisdiction over this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.  The 
Motion presents a “core” proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) over which the Court has 
authority to enter a final order.  The statutory predicates for the relief requested in this Motion 
include 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 (and § 365 to the extent applicable).  Venue in this Court is 
proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. 
III.  
AVOIDANCE ACTIONS 
Under two theories, the Diocese disclaims any beneficial interest in the tens of millions 
of dollars worth of real and personal property identified by the Committee.  First, it asserts that 
substantially all of its property is held in trust or subject to donor-imposed use restrictions.  
Second, the Debtor claims that Canon law is applicable by virtue of the First Amendment and 
that the Debtor’s determination that certain property is necessary to accomplish its religious 
mission overrides any civil law avoidance of the alleged trusts.   
The Diocese’s trust theories are based on allegations of an express trust, a charitable trust, 
a resulting trust and/or a constructive trust.  These trust theories are made of whole cloth.  On 
May 25, 2005, Tom Buzek, the Business Administrator of the Diocese, testified that the Bishop 
owns the “parishes and everything.”  See Deposition of Thomas Buzek, May 25, 2005 p. 17, ll. 
8--13, in Jane Doe 2 v. James E. Poole, SJ et al, Case no. 2NO-04-83 CI (BJE) (Exhibit E).  
Nonetheless, in the year prior to the Petition Date, the Diocese tried to document some of its new 
found trust theories by (i) recording “Notices of Beneficial Interest” against properties used by 
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the parishes and schools (the “Parish Properties”) (Exhibit. F as examplar)2, (ii) transferring $3 
million to the “Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska,” a newly-formed trust (Exhibit G), and 
(iii) amending its Articles of Incorporation (Exhibit H).  As explained below, these last-minute 
efforts are fraudulent conveyances and are avoidable under Alaska law or the Bankruptcy Code.  
Once freed of these fraudulent conveyances, the Committee can easily defeat the surviving 
unrecorded trusts under both Alaska law based on the rights of a bona fide purchaser of real 
property (“BFP”),3which rights can be asserted  by the estate under Bankruptcy Code §544(a)(3).   
The Debtor’s second theory regarding the property is that Canon law is applicable by 
virtue of the First Amendment and that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 
the Debtor’s determination that certain property is necessary to accomplish its religious mission 
overrides any civil law avoidance of the trusts or use restrictions.  To hold otherwise, the Diocese 
argues, is a substantial burden on religious freedom.  The Diocese’s position is untenable.  When 
a religious organization runs afoul of civil law, neutral principles of civil law apply.  St. Paul 
Church, Inc. v. Board of Trustee of Alaska Missionary Conference of United Methodist Church, 
Inc., 145 P.3d 541, 554 (Alaska 2006)(“[W]e adopt the neutral principles approach when 
resolving property disputes between religious organizations.”).  No court has ever held that a 
third-party’s rights under a judgment must be enforced in accordance with, or limited by, a 
judgment debtor’s religious laws.  In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R., 304, 321-22 
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006)(“Spokane”).  
Under civil law, there is no issue of fact that the Diocese is the owner of the property in question.   
A. The Committee Should Be Granted Standing to Bring Avoidance Actions. 
The law is well settled that bankruptcy courts may allow a party other than the trustee or 
debtor in possession to pursue an estate’s causes of action, including avoidance actions.  
                                                 
2  Additional evidence of the inextricably intertwined relationship between the Debtor and the parishes is the fact 
that Fr. Richard Case, while he was serving simultaneously as Vicar General of the Diocese and the priest 
responsible for parishes that did not have assigned pastors, signed 39 Notices of Beneficial Interest. 
3   A BFP is one who has acquired title without notice, actual or constructive, of another’s rights and also must have 
paid value for the same.  AS 13.36.170; James v. McCombs, 936 P.2d 520, 522, n.9 (Alaska 1997).   
Case 08-00110    Doc 440    Filed 05/11/09    Entered 05/11/09 08:50:29    Desc Main
 Document      Page 5 of 22

 18481-001\DOCS_LA:201935.1 6 
5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 547.11[6], p. 547-124 (15th ed. rev. 2005).  In Spaulding Composites 
Co., Inc., 207 B.R. 899, 903-04 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 
Ninth Circuit (the “B.A.P.”) held that a committee can assert a derivative claim on behalf of the 
estate after obtaining court approval.  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, in In re Parmetex, Inc., 199 
F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999), held that a creditor can have standing to assert avoidance claims.  
In Parmetex, creditors in a chapter 7 case filed a complaint to avoid fraudulent and preferential 
transfers and two months later entered into a stipulation with the chapter 7 trustee for authority to 
pursue such claims.  Id. at 1030.  The Ninth Circuit held that the creditors had standing to bring 
the action.  The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Parmetex was approvingly cited by the Ninth Circuit 
in Estate of Spirtos v. Superior Court Case, 443 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the 
Ninth Circuit held that a creditor of the estate who did not receive authorization from either the 
chapter 7 trustee or the bankruptcy court lacked standing to assert a RICO claim on behalf of the 
estate.   
Based on prior diocese chapter 11 cases, the Committee anticipates the Debtor will argue 
that the Motion can only be granted if the Debtor consents to the Committee’s standing.  The 
Committee believes that the Debtor is wrong on the law, and that the Parmatex and Spirtos 
decisions make that clear.  In a recently unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit sustained the 
dismissal of unsecured creditors’ fraudulent conveyance actions on the basis that they did not 
have standing. Carramerica Realty Corporation v. Nvidia Corporation, 2008 WL 5110821 (9th 
Cir. 2008)(“The trustee’s standing to sue on behalf of the estate is exclusive; a debtor’s creditors 
cannot prosecute such claims belonging to the estate unless the trustee first abandons such 
claims.”).  The Court does not state whether the unsecured creditors sought authority to bring the 
estates’ claims; they apparently did not.  Nothing in Carramerica states that the Bankruptcy 
Court is without jurisdiction to authorize a creditors committee to bring actions on behalf of the 
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estate.  Common sense dictates the result: if the Committee does not prosecute the Avoidance 
Actions, who will?4   
In order to have such derivative standing, the Committee must satisfy the following 
elements:  (1) a demand has been made on the Diocese, unless such a demand would be futile; 
(2) the demand has been declined; (3) a colorable claim exists against the prospective defendants 
that would benefit the estate; and (4) the inaction by the Diocese is unjustified.  See Canadian 
Pac. Forest Prods. Ltd. V. J.D. Irving, Ltd., 66 F.3d 1436, 1446 (6th Cir. 1995).  In the present 
case, the Committee meets all of these elements for derivative standing.   
1. Demand on the Diocese.   
After the exchange of the Committee’s letter regarding the scope of the property dispute 
and the Debtor’s plan term sheet, the Bankruptcy Court authorized the Committee to pursue its 
property litigation rights after November 14, 2008.  The mediation did not succeed. 
2. Avoidance Actions Are Valuable Assets of The Estate. 
The Debtor’s Avoidance Actions are a critical tool to the resolution of the property issue 
and ensuring payment of creditors’ claims in full.  The following discussion sets forth in some 
detail the Committee’s legal theories in support of the successful prosecution of the Avoidance 
Actions.  The Committee is not required to prove that it will succeed in avoiding the transfers in 
order to prevail on this Motion; i.e. this is not a summary judgment proceeding.  Rather, the 
Committee is required only to make a colorable claim.  However, since the Debtor and the 
Committee have already exchanged mediation briefs on these issues and their respective counsel 
have been through some of these arguments in other diocese cases, the Committee believes that 
the Court should have the benefit of the analysis that has been done to date.   
                                                 
4 In the Portland Archdiocese chapter 11 case, the Court vested the creditors’ committee with the Avoidance Actions 
and the committee asserted those rights against the parishes and other entities affiliated with the debtor in a 
successful summary judgment motion.    In the San Diego Diocese chapter 11 case, the Bankruptcy Court authorized 
the committee (represented by Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP) to undertake the Avoidance Actions against the 
San Diego Diocese (represented Quarles & Brady LLP) on a test case basis consisting of several parishes.  This 
Court should do so as well. 
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The Avoidance Actions could be used to set aside: (a) the asserted trust interests in real 
property and (b) transfers of substantial cash (approximately $3 million) from the Diocese to the 
Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska, a newly created trust, allegedly reflecting the asserted trust 
interests of the Parishes in the cash.  Based on examination of title records provided by the 
Debtor, the Committee cannot find a single instance of a recorded property deed that reflects the 
Debtor holding a substantial parcel of real property in a trust relationship.  However, just prior to 
the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the Diocese caused “Notices of Beneficial Interest” 
to be filed against its own title in each of the Parish Properties.  In addition, the Diocese amended 
its Articles of Incorporation to recite that it held such properties in trust.  Once the Committee is 
assigned the Avoidance Actions, it will seek to avoid the “Notices of Beneficial Interest,” any 
transfer accomplished by the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and the transfers to the 
Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska as fraudulent conveyances under Alaska law (applicable by 
virtue of Bankruptcy Code §544) and Bankruptcy Code §548.5  Once these transfers are avoided, 
the real property will be unencumbered by any recorded interest and subject to the estate’s rights 
of a hypothetical BFP without actual notice.  Under Alaska law, the BFP will prevail over those 
unrecorded interests.  See AS 40.17.080.  Once the property ownership issue is resolved, this 
case will have taken a giant leap forward.   
a. Fraudulent Conveyances: Intentional Fraud. 
The recordation of the “Notices of Beneficial Interest” and the amendment of the Articles 
of Incorporation within the year prior to the Petition Date are fraudulent conveyances under 
Alaska law (probably a three-year reach back) and the Bankruptcy Code (two-year reach back 
for transfers to third parties; ten-year reach back for transfers to self settled trusts).  AS 
34.40.020, Alaska’s fraudulent conveyance statute, and Bankruptcy Code §§548(a)(1)(A) and 
548(e)(1) invalidate transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.  In 
                                                 
5 The Committee also will attack the transfers on the basis that the Diocese-Related Entities are unincorporated 
divisions of the Debtor and that “their” property is actually property of the estate. 
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Bishop Kettler’s his first day declaration, the Bishop stated that the notices and the amendment 
were done in direct response to the success of the committees in the prior diocese chapter 11 
cases.  (Exhibit I)  Although the Diocese will contend that these actions simply documented 
long-standing trust relationships, AS 34.40.070 (the Statute of Frauds) requires interests in real 
property to be evidenced in writing.  The Debtor is presumed to own the legal and equitable 
interests in the real property.  See AS 34.15.030(b)(a warranty deed conveys real property with 
covenants that the grantor has a fee simple interest that is free from encumbrances and that the 
grantor will defend the title of the grantee).  None of the deeds of any material parcel of real 
property make any reference to a trust or any other restriction on title.   
Since the Parishes’ interests in the Parish Properties were not the subject of any written 
document before the Notices of Beneficial Interest, the Parishes did not have any interest in the 
real property before the creation and recordation of the Notices of Beneficial Interest.  Any 
transfers to the Parishes resulting from the amendment of the Articles (April 18, 2007) would be 
either a transfer to an unenforceable self-settled trust as the Parishes do not exist as bona fide 
separate entities or a fraudulent conveyance.  The Committee recognizes that the intent 
requirement may raise questions of fact but the admission at the first meeting of creditors 
provides irrefutable proof of the Debtor’s intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.   
Likewise, the transfer of $3 million from a Diocese account to the Catholic Trust of 
Northern Alaska for parishes, schools and related entities in the Diocese is a fraudulent 
conveyance.  In effect, the Diocese account was a Diocesan Bank where parishes could deposit 
their money to gain a fixed higher interest rate.  The Diocese’s Section 341 testimony is that it 
created the trust and made the transfer in response to adverse property rulings in the Spokane and 
Portland chapter 11 cases.  There are no facts that would permit a finding that the Diocese held 
such funds as a trustee before the creation of the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska; at best, it is 
the same debtor-creditor relationship that a bank has with its depositors.  None of the indicia of a 
pre-existing trust exist.   
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[T]he main characteristics of a trust relationship inter alia are: that 
the payor (trustor-beneficiary) retains the beneficial interest in the 
money paid (Rest.2d Trusts, § 12 coms. a and g at pp. 35, 37…By 
contrast, where the payment of the money is intended to create a 
debtor-creditor relationship, the money becomes the property of 
the payee; he may commingle it with his own funds and use it for 
his own purposes and the payor retains no beneficial interest in the 
money, but rather relies on his contractual rights against the payee 
(Rest.2d Trusts, § 12, coms. a and g at pp. 35, 37; see also 
Petherbridge v. Prudential Sav. & Loan Assn. (1978) 79 
Cal.App.3d 509, 517-518, 145 Cal. Rptr. 87). 
Tyler v. State of California, 134 Cal.App.3d 973, 977-78, 185 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1982); Petherbridge 
v. Prudential Sav. & Loan Assn., 79 Cal.App.3d 509, 518, 145 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1978) (same).  The 
facts are undisputed that the money was deposited into, commingled and held in the Diocese’s 
pooled investment account, consisting of Diocesan funds (radio station and school funds) and 
parish funds, and that the funds were not invested for the benefit of the “trustor,” but held and 
purportedly credited with a fixed rate of return.  The remittances from the Parishes to the 
Diocese are third-party deposits, and such deposits created a debtor-creditor relationship, not a 
trust relationship.  There are no facts sufficient to support a finding that a trust existed as to such 
funds.  As a result, the Parishes (if separate entities from the Diocese) are nothing more than 
general unsecured creditors. 
Even if the Parishes were separate legal entities and even if there were a trust 
relationship, the Parishes still would not have an equitable interest in the Diocesan bank funds 
senior to creditors under any trust theory, because the Parishes cannot trace their funds.      
In Bullion Reserve, the Ninth Circuit addressed this precise point. 
It held that a beneficiary of an insolvent, trustee debtor must be 
able to trace its funds in order to claim any property of the debtor. 
Absent this tracing, all the funds shall be treated as property of the 
debtor to guarantee the equal treatment of creditors under the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).  In re Bullion Reserve, 836 F.2d at 
1218. When a trustee debtor is insolvent and the beneficiaries 
cannot trace their funds, the beneficiaries must stand in the 
position of general creditors. Barrow, 878 F.2d at 915; 
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In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1015 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).  See also City of 
Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 477, 80 
Cal.Rptr.2d 329 (1st Dist. 1998) (“Thus, for purposes of federal bankruptcy law, the County Pool 
is a debtor and a debtor-creditor relationship exists between the Pool and its depositors, even 
though the Pool is also a trust and the Pool Participants are trust beneficiaries under section 
27100.1.”).   
Finally, on April 18, 2007, in response to the property ownership decisions in the 
Spokane and Portland cases that were adverse to those dioceses, Bishop Kettler amended the 
Diocese’s Articles of Incorporation to assert that the corporation sole holds in trust all of the real 
property, personal property and funds of the Diocese in trust for the parishes, missions, schools, 
juridic persons within the boundaries of the Diocese and ministries outside the Diocese.  The 
Diocese’s 1952 Articles of Incorporation said nothing of this “trust” but rather mimicked AS 
10.40.010’s statement of authorized persons “([F]or the benefit of religion . . . .”).  He did this in 
the name of asset protection, with the intent to hinder the collection of judgments against the 
Diocese for its role in facilitating and perpetuating the sexual abuse of children by its priests.  If 
the Amendment was to be treated as effectuating a transfer of property into trust, it would be 
patently avoidable as a fraudulent transfer of Diocesan property. 
b. Fraudulent Conveyances: Constructive Fraud. 
The Diocese’s transfers of property of the estate are void as fraudulent conveyances 
regardless of the intent of the transferor.  Bankruptcy Code §548(a)(1)(B) incorporates a 
constructive fraud theory not otherwise available under Alaska Statues.  It requires that the 
transferor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and was 
insolvent or rendered insolvent on the date of the transfer.  No one contends that the Debtor 
received anything in exchange for the transfers evidenced by the Notices of Beneficial Interest, 
the Amendment or the transfers to the Trust.  At the first meeting of creditors, the Diocese 
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testified that it believed itself to be insolvent in early 2007.  It simply transferred millions of 
dollars in the face of that admitted insolvency. 
c. The Unrecorded Trusts Are Avoidable By Virtue of the Estate’s 
Rights As a BFP. 
Once the Committee has avoided the fraudulent transfers, Section 544(a)(3) gives it 
hypothetical BFP status and allows it to avoid any interests in property that could be avoided by 
a BFP.  The Diocese contends that its holds the Parish Property in trust for the Parishes.  Alaska 
law provides that an unrecorded trust interest is subordinate to the rights of a BFP of real 
property.  See AS 40.17.080.6  See In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 335 
B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (“Portland”) 
The Parishes may argue that the District Court in the Spokane Diocese case ruled that 
resulting trusts cannot be avoided under Section 544(a)(3).  That is inaccurate, and if it were 
accurate, the decision would clearly be erroneous.  The District Court held that the Parishes had 
submitted sufficient evidence to support a finding that the properties were subject to a resulting 
trust, and it therefore reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s award of summary judgment to the 
committee.  See Committee of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. 
Wash. 2006).  The committee had not been given standing to pursue avoidance claims in that 
case.7  The District Court did cite In re Torrez, 63 B.R. 751 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986), aff’d, 827 
F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1987) and stated that Torrez “held that the “strong arm” power of section 544 
of the Bankruptcy Code could not make the corpus of a valid resulting trust property of the 
bankruptcy debtor.”  Id.  What Torrez actually held is that (a) a lien creditor cannot overcome a 
resulting trust, and (b) “only a bona fide purchaser without notice can upset a resulting trust.”  
Id., 63 B.R. at 754.   
                                                 
6 In the Spokane Diocese chapter 11 case, the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that Committee would prevail under 
Section 544 against the parish unrecorded interests. 
7 “In this case, of course, the parties represented by the Tort Litigants Committee or the Tort Claimant Committees, 
are not in the posture of a bona fide purchaser nor are they in the posture of judgment creditors of the Diocese or any 
individual Parish, since none of the underlying claims have been litigated or reduced to judgment.”  Id. at 94.   
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The Ninth Circuit confirmed that the holding of Torrez was limited: “Torrez did not hold 
that section 544 was inapplicable in general to resulting trusts or any other kind of trust.”  In re 
Tleel, 876 F.2d at 772; see also Portland, 335 B.R. at 878 (it is “not the character of the trust that 
determined whether the interest was avoidable, but where there was constructive notice of that 
interest at the time of bankruptcy.”); In re Fjeldsted, 293 B.R. 12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (priority 
over unrecorded equitable interests under § 544(a)(3) turns on whether purchaser would have 
had constructive notice of those interests at the time of the bankruptcy filing).  In Portland,  
Judge Perris granted summary judgment to the committee, holding that there was no issue of fact 
that the estate would not be charged with constructive notice of any trust interest of the parishes.  
As addressed below, the same result should obtain here.  
The Committee cannot find any Alaska case on the point of the rights of a BFP against a 
resulting trust beneficiary, but the general rule is that resulting trusts are subordinate to the rights 
of a BFP.  Therefore, the Committee believes that Alaska courts would follow this general rule.  
See Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees § 466 (“Resulting trusts of the purchase money type are subject 
to the bona fide purchaser rule, as are all other trusts, express or implied. If the trustee as legal 
title holder conveys, pledges or mortgages the subject matter of the trust to a purchaser for value 
who has no notice of the existence of the trust, the equitable interest of the resulting beneficiary 
will be cut off.”); Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 
732 (1992)(“Where the existence of the trust and the trustee's status are undisclosed and 
unrecorded, third parties who acquire real property from trustees or have any dealings with 
trustees concerning real property are deemed bona fide.”); Moultrie v. Wright, 154 Cal. 520, 523, 
98 P. 257, 259 (1908) (“If Doane had no notice when he took the mortgage, nor prior to his 
death, and the administratrix bought for the benefit of the estate, without notice, she would hold 
as an innocent purchaser free from the trust.”) (citing Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 580, 32 Pac. 
579 (1893)).   
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d. A BFP Would Have Had No Record or Constructive Notice of 
Parishes’ or Parishioners’ Purported Equitable Interests, and Any Such Interests Are 
Therefore Avoidable Under Section 544(a)(3). 
(1) Record Notice 
There is no record notice of the Parishes’ equitable interest in the Parish Properties 
because the Diocese holds fee simple title to all of the substantial Parish Properties.  See AS 
34.15.030(b)(providing that a warranty deed conveys real property with covenants that the 
grantor has a fee simple interest that is free from encumbrances and that the grantor will defend 
the title of the grantee).  There are no other unavoidable deeds or encumbrances of record, or 
referenced in documents of record, that suggest the existence of adverse interests to the Diocese.   
(2) Occupancy of the Properties Does Not Confer Inquiry Notice 
The Committee will be able to demonstrate that a BFP would not be charged with inquiry 
notice of others alleged interests in the Real Properties.  Portland, 335 B.R. at 888 (“I conclude 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the TCC is entitled under § 544(a)(3) to avoid 
any unrecorded interests in the test properties.”)   
A hypothetical BFP  would not have had constructive notice of any equitable interest of 
any entity other than the Diocese in the Parish Properties.  A purchaser is not always under a 
duty to make inquiries; the duty arises when suspicious facts suggest outstanding equities in a 
third-party.  Modrok v. Marshall, 523 P.2d 172 (Alaska 1974), citing Randall v. Allen, 180 Cal. 
298, 180 P. 941(1919)(ruling that adverse possession consistent with use by record title owner 
does not trigger duty to inquire.).  The legal standard for determining whether occupancy gives 
rise to a duty of inquiry is well-established in Alaska and else where.  The possession required to 
impart notice to a subsequent purchaser must be open, notorious, exclusive and visible, and not 
consistent with the record title.  Id., citing Randall v. Allen, 180 Cal. 298, 180 P. 941 
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(1919)(“[P]ossession in order to be sufficient to establish notice must be open, notorious, 
exclusive, and visible, and not consistent with the record title.”).8   
Under this exacting standard, the occupancy of the Parish Properties could not remotely 
create inquiry notice as to purported equitable interests adverse to those of the Diocese.  A 
purchaser viewing the Parish Properties would see nothing inconsistent with the Diocese’s 
exclusive ownership and plenary power to convey property.  All of the Parish Properties are 
being used as Catholic churches or Catholic schools.  A prudent purchaser would expect to see 
parishioners and parish level employees on the Parish Properties. Certainly, any purchaser would 
expect to see property owned by the Diocese being used by Catholics as a Catholic facility for 
the purposes of the Catholic Church. It would be unreasonable to require such a purchaser to 
inquire into whether these individuals claim equitable interests in the property.  Otherwise, no 
purchaser could obtain good title from a nonprofit organization with donors, program 
participants or administrative subdivisions. 
The Diocese’s own conduct and representations would lead a prudent purchaser to 
conclude that the Diocese is a unitary entity that encompasses parishes and schools, and can give 
unfettered title to the Parish Properties. None of the parishes or schools are organized under 
Alaska law.  While certain parishes have registered their names with the State of Alaska, the 
owner of the names is a nun or priest employed by the Diocese.  The Diocese itself publicly 
stated that it is the owner of the parish properties in the Fairbanks area when it submitted 
property tax exemption applications.  (Exhibit J)  All of this information is consistent with the 
                                                 
8 The above-described principles have been endorsed in so many jurisdictions, for so long, that space 
constraints preclude a complete listing of cases. A representative sample includes the following: 
Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 511 (1883) (construing Utah law); Touchstone v. Peterson, 443 So.2d 
1219, 1225 (Ala. 1983); Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Avco Dev. Co., 14 Ariz. App. 56, 61 (1971); Clay 
Properties, Inc. v. Washington Post Co., 604 A.2d 890, 896 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that possession 
must be "sufficiently distinct and unequivocal so as to put the purchaser on his guard"); Bacote v. 
Wyckoff, 251 Ga. 862, 866 (1984); Beals v. Cryer, 99 Ill. App. 3d 842, 844-45 (1981); Olson v. Olson, 
203 Minn. 199, 205 (1938); Kransky v. Hensleigh, 146 Mont. 486, 492 (1965); Patten v. Moore, 32 N.H. 
382 (1855); Gregory v. Alexander, 51 Tenn. App. 307, 315 (1963). 
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Diocese’s ownership of the Parish Properties and belies any claim by the Parishes that their 
occupancy is evidence of their purported interests giving rise to inquiry notice. 
(3) The Parishes’ Occupancy of the Properties is Not Exclusive 
When two or more persons jointly occupy property, one of whom is the record owner, a 
purchaser is under no duty to inquire into the rights of others.  The rationale for this rule is that 
"where a prospective purchaser or encumbrancer of property finds the record owner in 
occupancy thereof, there is normally nothing in the mere circumstance that there are other 
occupants of the property to arouse any suspicion that such others are claiming an interest 
inconsistent with the record title." Annotation, Occupancy of Premises by Both Record Owner 
and Another as Notice of Title or Interest of Latter, 2 A.L.R. 2d 857, at § 2 (1948); see also 1 
Patton & Palomar on Land Titles § 12.   
The law in Alaska is the same: possession must be, among other things, exclusive.  Any 
Parish or parishioner who could conceivably claim occupancy of a Parish Property would at best 
be in a cooperatively appearing joint occupancy with the pastor and Diocesan personnel.  Such 
occupancy would not put a reasonable prospective purchaser on inquiry notice.   
(4) Parishioners’ Occupancy of The Properties is Temporary and 
Occasional 
A purchaser is not put on inquiry notice by an occupancy that is only temporary or 
occasional.  See 3 Patton & Palomar on Land Titles § 674 (intermittent or occasional use of land 
is insufficient to operate as notice to a purchaser).  An individual parishioner’s or student’s 
occupancy of the Parish Properties is temporary and occasional, and would be recognized as 
such by a reasonable purchaser.  Nothing about their presence would prompt a purchaser to 
inquire about potential equitable interests. 
(5) Statements and Schedules Do Not Provide Inquiry Notice 
Nor do the Debtor’s schedules of assets and liabilities and/or statement of financial 
affairs do not provide sufficient notice to a BFP of the existence of equitable interests in the 
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Parish Properties.  Judge Perris sensibly rejected such arguments to the contrary.  Portland, 335 
B.R. 842 at 881-82;.  In re Deuel, 361 B.R. 509, 514-15 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)(such documents 
filed with petition are filed after the commencement of the case).   
(6) The Amended Articles of Incorporation Do Not Provide Inquiry 
Notice 
Bishop Kettler amendment of the Diocese’s Articles may enable the Diocese to argue that 
a BFP of real property would be on notice of the trust claims.  If the amendment was a transfer of 
property to a trust, nothing in the amended Articles would give notice that a sale by the Debtor 
would violate the trust.  Alaska law allows a trustee to sell property of a trust (AS 13.36.109(3)), 
absent actual knowledge that the sale violates a term of the trust, the buyer would be a BFP.  See 
Weiss v. State of Alaska, 939 P.2d 380, 389 (Alaska 1997)(in assessing a trial court’s settlement, 
the Supreme Court observed, “It also determined that, because most of the purchasers did not 
buy the land with knowledge of the breach of trust, these sales would probably be upheld under 
basic principles of trust law.”); Kurowski v. Burch, 1972, 290 N.E.2d 401, 8 Ill.App.3d 716, aff’d 
1974, 312 N.E.2d 284, 57 Ill.2d 292(finding no resulting trust in favor of plaintiffs representing 
former parishioners and their heirs was imposed since defendants were bona fide purchasers 
without knowledge of any restrictions on the use of the conveyed property or the power of the 
trustees to sell the property.) 
The consequence of Section 544(a)(3) is that "[t]he estate gets what the debtor could 
convey under local law…."  Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1989).  Alaska law 
unambiguously grants a corporation sole the power to acquire, hold, sell, convey and dispose of 
property.  See AS 10.40.070(1).  Nothing in the applicable statutes provides that a corporation 
sole must obtain the approval of any other person to sell assets, unless required by its articles of 
incorporation.  And while the amended Articles assert that the Diocese holds property in trust for 
parishes and laity, it does not state any restriction on the right of the Diocese to sell it, and a BFP 
has no duty to ask. See Portland, 335 B.R. at 887 (“Although someone inquiring about 
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purchasing property titled in the name of the Archdiocese of Portland and occupied by Catholic 
churches, schools and cemeteries might be told that the parish or school needed to agree to the 
sale, that fact does not give rise to a duty to make the inquiry in the first place.”).  Finally, even if 
beneficiary consent was required, Alaska law provides that the trust evidenced by the amended 
Articles is revocable.  See AS 13.36.338(a); St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Alaska 
Missionary Conference of United Methodist Church, Inc.  145 P.3d 541, 557 (Alaska 2006)(“But 
we note that under different facts, we, like the California court in St. Luke's, might determine that 
in accordance with AS 13.36.338(a) a trust created by a local church in favor of a parent church 
is revocable.”).  See California-Nevada Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. St. 
Luke's United Methodist Church,  121 Cal.App.4th 754, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 442, 445 (2004). 
In short, nothing in the amended Articles would give constructive notice of any 
restriction on the Diocese’s ability to convey good title to the Parish Properties because, in the 
final analysis, no such restriction exists.   
Incorporated dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church are not subject to any restrictions 
imposed by parishes or parishioners with respect to the alienation of church property.  Across the 
country, dioceses are selling church property, often over the strenuous objections of parishes and 
laity, to satisfy just debts.  Any argument that the trust terminology in the Amended Articles 
restricts the Bishop’s authority to sell is functionally an attempt to vest the Diocese with 
discretion over what debts to pay.  That is untenable and contrary to bankruptcy law. 
IV.  
NON-AVOIDANCE ACTION LITIGATION CLAIMS  
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES 
The Committee also seeks authority to commence an action against the Holy See for 
breaches of its duties to the Diocese and to file a third-party complaint against the Holy See in 
the underlying state court litigation.   
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The Diocese should commence an action against the Holy See for breach of its duties to 
the Diocese.  At least three canons of the Code of Canon Law establish the Holy See’s duty to 
the Debtor.  Canon 331 provides, “By virtue of his [the Roman Bishop] office he possesses 
supreme, full, immediate, and universal ordinary power in the Church, which he is always able to 
exercise freely”, Canon 1256 provides, “Under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff, 
ownership of goods belongs to that juridic person which has acquired them legitimately”, and 
Canon 1273, “By virtue of his primacy of governance, the Roman Pontiff is the supreme 
administrator and steward of all ecclesiastical goods.”  As the supreme administrator and steward 
of all ecclesiastical goods which include the property of the Debtor and as possessor of supreme 
ordinary power,  the Pope, in his capacity as head of the Holy See, had a duty to protect those 
survivors of clergy sexual abuse and the property of the Diocese.  The Committee contends that 
the bishops and clergy in the Diocese are employees and agents of the Holy See and had the 
obligation to fulfill such duties as to the ecclesiastical property and the faithful in the Diocese.   
In or about 1962, the Holy See through the Holy Office (today the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith) issued a document titled Crimen Sollicitationis which remained in effect 
until at least 2001.  Crimen Sollicitatonis establishes procedures for canonical cases in which 
priests were accused of solicitation of sex in confession, clergy sex with minors, homosexual 
relations and bestiality.  Throughout the document, archbishops, bishops, heads of religious 
orders and clergy are instructed to maintain absolute secrecy regarding accusations of, inter alia, 
sexual abuse of minors.  The Committee assumes that the bishops of the Diocese (and the 
ordinaries in control of the Diocese before it was erected) received this document as it was 
directed to all archbishops and bishops throughout the world.  An accurate English translation of 
the document is attached hereto as Exhibit K.  Adherence to the procedures contained in this 
document by the Holy See’s employees in the Diocese was a contributing cause of the sexual 
abuse of children in the Diocese and has jeopardized the ecclesiastical property of the Debtor by 
virtue of the claims of survivors of sexual abuse.  Testimony in state court proceedings in 
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California indicate that procedures substantially similar to those set forth in Crimen 
Sollicitationis, including the mandate of secrecy, have existed at least as early as 1922.   
The Holy See’s mandate of the procedures in the document and the secrecy regarding 
accusations of sexual abuse constitute a violation of its duty as an ordinary and its duty of 
administration and stewardship over the Debtor’s property, resulting in substantial damages to 
the Debtor.  As the bishops and clergy of the Diocese are employees of the Holy See, their 
compliance with Crimen Sollicitationis and its legal precedent is tortious conduct subjecting the 
Holy See to liability notwithstanding the Holy See’s claims of sovereign immunity.  See 
O’Bryan v. Holy See, 2008 WL 4964143 (6th Cir. 2008).   
The Diocese also should utilize Rule 14 of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure to file a 
third-party complaint against the Holy See in the underlying prepetition state court actions to 
provide for equitable apportionment of the liability for the sexual abuses alleged therein.  The 
sexual abuse alleged in the complaints occurred by perpetrators while acting with the scope of 
employment, as part of the agency relationship with the Holy See (including the Papal Nuncio 
and congregations assigned to supervise the Diocese) was committed with the apparent authority 
arising from the employment and/or agency relationship.  The Committee believes that such a 
complaint is appropriate, as compared to the plaintiffs in the state court actions amending their 
complaint, so as to avoid a defense by the Holy See that it is protected by the statute of 
limitations.  See Alaska General Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell, 1 P.3d 98 (Alaska 2000). 
V.  
FIRST AMENDMENT AND RFRA DO NOT EXEMPT DIOCESE PROPERTY FROM 
THE CREDITORS’ CLAIMS  
The Diocese has stated its intention to argue that certain property should be exempt from 
the creditors’ claims because it is necessary to the fulfillment of the Diocese’s mission.  The 
Committee is not certain which property will fall within this claim but it anticipates that it will 
include property of substantial value.   
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The Debtor’s claims are likely based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
and RFRA9.  RFRA is not applicable to the property issue to the extent it turns on state law 
because it cannot be constitutionally applied to the states.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997).  Even if it were applicable, the inclusion of the property in the estate does not violate 
RFRA.  In Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
To establish a prima facie RFRA claim, a plaintiff must present 
evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact rationally to find the 
existence of two elements. First, the activities the plaintiff claims 
are burdened by the government action must be an “exercise of 
religion.”  Second, the government action must “substantially 
burden” the plaintiff's exercise of religion. See id. If the plaintiff 
cannot prove either element, his RFRA claim fails. Conversely, 
should the plaintiff establish a substantial burden on his exercise of 
religion, the burden of persuasion shifts to the government to prove 
that the challenged government action is in furtherance of a 
“compelling governmental interest” and is implemented by “the 
least restrictive means.” See id. § 2000bb-1(b).  
The Diocese cannot satisfy its burden to establish that the inclusion of the endowment 
funds or the Parish Properties in the estate is a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.  
Nothing in the Committee’s theory of what is property of the estate requires the Diocese to 
change its religious beliefs.  The inclusion of the Parish Properties as property of the estate does 
not necessitate their sale; but rather their value would be a component of the total amount that 
the Best Interest of Creditors Test requires be paid to creditors under a plan.  Even if Parish 
properties had to be sold, such a sale would not be a “substantial burden.”   Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988)(finding 
that government logging plan that diminishes the sacredness of the land to Indians and interferes 
significantly with their ability to practice their religion did not constitute a substantial burden 
under the Free Exercise Clause).   
                                                 
9   42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb 
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Moreover, even if the Diocese could establish a substantial burden from the inclusion of 
its property in the bankruptcy estate, the Committee is not aware of any less restrictive means of 
satisfying the compelling governmental interest in compensating survivors and preventing future 
child abuse.   
VI.  
CONCLUSION 
The property of the bankruptcy estate will be significantly augmented by the exercise of 
the Avoidance Powers and the claims against the Holy See.  For all of the reasons set forth 
above, the Committee requests that it be authorized to file, prosecute and settle the Avoidance 
Actions and the claims against the Holy See that are set forth in the complaint, attached hereto as 
Exhibit L.  
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